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In fact, as recent events have shown, a
rather different but equally authentic
version of “Iraq-as-Lebanon” has been
emerging. The rise to prominence of
sectarian and ethnic leaders, intra-com-
munal struggles for power and influ-
ence, the emergence of communally-
based militias, sectarian murders and
acts of terror, the abduction of foreign-
ers as bargaining tools, the involve-
ment of outside powers in the country
for their own strategic advantage—all
of this looks horribly familiar to those
who had watched Lebanon’s torment in the 1970s and the 1980s.
The turmoil has presented the US and its coalition allies with their
greatest challenge since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, but these devel-
opments are a direct consequence of policies pursued by the US in
Iraq. They come out of a reading of Iraqi political society which has em-
phasized the communal at the expense of the national, a reading rein-
forced by a range of Iraqis who either think this is indeed the way in
which power should be handled, or who fear the reconstruction of the
powerful central state apparatus which had ruled so brutally for so
long.1
Initially, the coalition forces encouraged local forms of power to help
restore order in the vacuum created by the collapse of central govern-
ment. For many local elites long used to positioning themselves in
order to serve the central authorities, it was natural to gravitate to-
wards the source of patronage—and to present themselves for recog-
nition as representatives of their communities. In the absence of elec-
toral processes, there were few to gainsay them and they rapidly be-
came the interlocutors of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). 
Under Bremer’s direction, however, this also became the principle on
which the emerging national Iraqi politics was based. The occupation
authorities consistently treated sectarian, ethnic, and tribal features of
Iraqi society as if they were the only framework for social and political
order, as demonstrated by the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) and the
Iraqi Council of Ministers. 
Security vacuum
Equally importantly, and ominously for the future, the CPA’s dismissal
of the Iraqi security forces and the dispersal and disintegration of the
Iraqi police, left a security vacuum which the over-stretched allied
forces were unable to fill. In response, local militias, some better organ-
ised than others, emerged to restore some modicum of security in the
lawlessness that followed the invasion. In doing so, of course, they be-
came potential assets in a developing political game. Officially the mili-
tias were condemned by the CPA. In fact, many have been tolerated,
even encouraged by the CPA as it seeks local allies to help keep order. 
Most obviously, this has applied to the largest indigenous armed
force in Iraq, the 40,000 or so Kurdish peshmerga (fighters) of the Kur-
dish Democratic Party and the Popular Union of Kurdistan. It has also
extended to the Badr Brigade of the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), and to units affiliated to the Shia al-Da‘wa
(The Call) party, one of the oldest Islamist movements in Iraq. Since all
of these organizations had been recognized by the CPA and brought
into the IGC, they were regarded as “forces for order.” More surprising-
ly perhaps, until March 2004 US forces shied away from taking on the
Jaish al-Mahdi (Army of the Rightly Guided One), the militia of the rad-
ical Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. They too had been able to organise as
neighbourhood security units in Baghdad and in towns across south-
ern Iraq—and given the license granted to other CPA-approved mili-
tias, saw no reason not to do so. Meanwhile, in many parts of the coun-
try, tribal sheikhs have been allowed to
raise their own armed retinues. These
developments inevitably led to the
emergence of counter-militias in the
so-called “Sunni triangle.”
Inbuild tensions
At the same time, the CPA has been
pursuing a potentially contradictory
strategy, some of the problems of
which became apparent in March and
April 2004. With great speed, it rushed
to reconstruct the national Iraqi police
force; it accelerated the rebuilding of the Iraqi armed forces, essential-
ly as an internal policing force; it established the Iraqi Civil Defence
Corps, as well as the Border Force and the Facilities Protection Force.
Faced by dissent and then insurgency, the CPA deployed the familiar
tactics of forcible detention, collective punishment, and military re-
pression. They found, however, that the Iraqi security forces fell apart
when ordered into action and the US forces took on the task them-
selves. The consequence is that the US is desperately trying to stiffen
the resolve of the Iraqi security forces by bringing back senior officers
of the former army more familiar with this style of internal security
work.2
These developments are not reassuring. It is not simply the inconsis-
tency of the CPA’s direction. It is also the probability that the future
Iraqi government will preside over a state in which there is an inbuilt
tension between the temptation to farm out security and economic re-
sources to provincial, communal elites, and the impulse to assert the
central government’s monopoly of violence and of oil revenues. As
things threaten to fall apart and economic reconstruction is stalled,
there are many Iraqis who may find the reassertion of strong central
state leadership the lesser of two evils.3
However, such a trend will be resisted by those Iraqis who have tast-
ed a degree of autonomy during the past year—and, in the Kurdish
case, during the past thirteen years. It will be a test for those who take
charge in Iraq. Historically, Iraqi governing elites, when confronted by
social unrest or provincial resentment, have all too often lost their
nerve and responded forcefully, hoping that coercion will impose the
order that has failed to emerge from consent. In the coming battle-
ground of Iraqi politics, one can only hope that these very experiences
will steer them away from a form of rule that has exacted such a terri-
ble toll in Iraqi history.
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Politics
The US Vice-President Dick Cheney and some
of those close to him in Washington have been
very taken with the “Lebanese model” for
Iraq. Presumably, this conjures up the vision
of a pluralist republic, open to free enterprise
and foreign capital, presided over by an elite
of zu‘ama (notables and local leaders), with
sufficient common interest in the status quo
to keep the whole thing going. This comes
either from a selective reading of pre-1967
Lebanese political history, or from a heavily
edited version of the post-Ta’if era.
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